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Abstract Market interactions between the common-
property commercial fishery and (1) competitive aquaculturists
and (2) a dominant-firm aquaculturist are modeled. It is found
that the entry of a competitive aquaculturist increases natural
fish stocks, reduces price, and increases total supply. If initially
the natural fish stock is at a level below maximum sustainable
yield, entry ofthe aquaculturist results in an increase in supply
from the commercial fishery. In the second part, the aquacul-
turist is modeled as a dominant firm. In some situations, the
aquaculturist behaves in a manner similar to the competitive
case, but impacts on price, fish stock, and efficiency will not
be as large. It is shown that there also exist cases where the
dominant aquaculturist will desire to promote overexploitation
ofthe natural fish stock.
Introduction
Commercial aquaculture in the United States is in its initial de-
velopment stages. In the past two decades, interest in and growth
of aquaculture have increased significantly.
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The potential growth in aquaculture production can be more
fully appreciated by considering cases where aquaculture is al-
ready an important factor. For example, Norway has made great
strides in pen-reared Atlantic salmon aquaculture. Norway first
initiated pen rearing of Atlantic salmon and rainbow trout in the
early 1960s; however, production of salmon became important
only after 1970. Production of salmon between 1974 and 1983
increased from 600 metric tons to approximately 16,500 metric
tons (Nordness 1984). Production is expected to continue to in-
crease at a rapid pace.
In Japan the production of cultured marine fish, mussels, and
seaweeds increased from 48,000 metric tons in 1950 to 917,000
metric tons in 1978. In 1978 total cultured output represented
9% ofthe total supply but approximately 809f ofthe yellowtail
production and 94% of the eel production (Brown and Nishimura
1983). Another example of aquaculture's rapid growth is Ec-
uador's pond-grown shrimp industry. In 1976 only 13% of Ec-
uador's shrimp production came from aquacuiture, but by 1981
farmed shrimp represented 15%. Imports of Ecuadorian shrimp
to the United States (second largest after Mexico) have steadily
increased in recent years and in 1982 were 24.74 million pounds,
44% of which came from shrimp farms (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1982). It is expected that by 1990 annual production
may reach 100 million pounds (Shipley 1984).
In the United States production of catfish from aquaculture
was only a few thousand pounds in 1963. By 1969 it was about
60 million pounds, and in 1983 it was about 137 million pounds,
liveweight (Bardach et al. 1972; U.S. Department of Agriculture
1984). In Oregon private salmon-ranching operations had returns
of coho which were insignificant in 1975. However, by 1982,
privately aquacultured coho represented 122,100 (14.5%) ofthe
844,100 ocean catch (troll and sport) off of Oregon and Califor-
nia, plus 165.000 adult and 19,300 jack coho returned to private
salmon ranchers (Pacific Fisheries Management Council 1983),
indicating that approximately 30% of fhe coho salmon harvested
in Oregon were derived from private aquaculture activity.
I Most ofthe private salmon aquaculture in the United States
is done by three companies: Oregon Aqua-Foods, Inc., a sub-Aquaculture and Common-Property Commercial Fishery 3
sidiary of Weyerhaeuser; Andromous, Inc.. a subsidiary of Brit-
ish Petroleum; and Domsea, a subsidiary of Campbell's Soup.
Other aquaculture projects have also attracted significant in-
vestment from such companies as Southern California Edison
(lobster, abalone), American Trust Corporation of Maryland
(oyster). General Mills (shrimp). Ralston Purina (catfish,
shrimp). International Paper (crawfish), and Hormel (catfish).
Such expenditures indicate the potential for changes in the mar-
ket structure for certain species.
The first objective of this paper is to explore the interactive
effects between open-access common-property commercial fish-
ery and competitive aquaculturists. The equilibrium and result-
ing dynamics caused by entry of commercial aquaculturists are
evaluated. The second section ofthe paper focuses on possible
interactions that may result when the aquaculturist is modeled
as a dominant firm and the common-property fishery is char-
acterized as perfectly competitive. The presentation is restricted
to a discussion of bioeconomic efficiency and industry dynamics.
A compiete analysis of the social welfare implications of aqua-
culture is beyond the scope of this work.
Competitive Model
This section contains an analysis of an open-access fishery faced
with a linear demand and a linear supply from the aquacuiture
sector. All participants are assumed to be pricetakers.
Consider the model ofthe open-access fishery as presented in
Clark (1976, pp. 153-157). Briefly summarized, the growth equa-
tion is
X = rX{\ - Xlk) - EX (1)
where E is fishing effort, X is fish stock, r is intrinsic growth
rate, k is environmental carrying capacity, and EX is yield (Kf).
Profit IT is given by
It = {pX - c)E (2)^ James L. Anderson
where p is price/biomass and c is cost per unit of fishing effort
(constant).
In equilibrium, the open-access supply is
Yr = -{\ - cipk) (3)
Now assume that equilibrium total demand is
J" = 3i - ^iP (4)
and that the supply from the aquaculture sector is given by
Y (5)
where p,, 32. and 72 are nonnegative constants and 7, is a non-
positive constant. It is further assumed that aquaculfure has no
direct impacts on the biology ofthe natural fishery and that the
aquaculture product is a perfect substitute for the natural prod-
uct. Examples where this appears to be the case are lobster and
shrimp culture, pen-reared yellowtail, Atlantic salmon, and sev-
eral other species of finfish. The fishery sector now faces an
equilibrium net demand—total demand (equation 4) minus aqua-
culture supply (equation 5)—which takes into account the supply
from aquaculture. expressed by
YF = 3I - 7I - (3. + 72)P for/3 > -71/72 (6«)
I YF = ^x - 32P for/? < -71/72 idh)
The equilibrium net demand for aquaculturists is simply the total
demand (equation 4) minus fishery supply (equation 3).
I The equilibrium natural fishery supply under two different net
demand situations is found in Figure \a. and the corresponding
equilibrium net aquaculture demand with two different aqua-
culture supply situations is found in Figure \h. The initial equi-
librium in both figures is to with price p,,. natural fishery supplyAquaculture and Common-Property Commercial Fishery 5
is Yfx), and there is no aquaculture supply. If technology existed
such that the competitive aquaculture supply was given by 5^
(Figure \b), the resulting net demand facing the fishery hDD'D
(Figure \a). The presence of aquaculture wili lead to reduced
consumer price (/"). increased total supply ( Y'A + Y'r), increased
natural fish stock, and reduced fishing effort. The efficiency of
the competitive fishery is improved as more fish are landed with
less effort. The biological basis of the natural fishery industry
causes the nonconventional response of increased catch. When
the fishery is initially exploited beyond maximum sustainable
yield, the biological growth characteristics of the natural fish
stock may create an equilibrium net demand which is positively
sloped for a portion.
If the technology is present such that aquaculture supply is
given by SA (Figure 16), then the net demand the competitive
fishery is given by D'D'D. (Figure \a). Under these conditions
equilibrium price is reduced to /?", which results in a natural fish
stock that exceeds the maximum sustainable yield level. In the
range where the fish stock exceeds maximum sustainable yield,
the equilibrium fishery supply has the normal positive slope;
therefore, the net demand facing the aquaculturists is always
negatively sloped. Other equilibrium results under these con-
ditions are that total supply is increased {Y"F + Y"A) and fishing
effort is reduced.
The special case where multiple equilibria initially exist in the
competitive fishery is shown in Figure lc. This situation results
in a perverse net demand for the aquaculturist that is nonnegative
for some prices when the fish stock is below maximum sustain-
able yield levels, zero for some range around maximum sustain-
able yield, and nonnegative again for fish stocks above maximum
sustainable yield (Figure \d).
In this case if initial equilibrium is e^ with po (Figure lc) and
supply from the fishery of r^xi, the presence of aquaculture sup-
ply, S'A, (Figure 1^) will shift the demand facing the fishery of
DDD, resulting in a new equilibrium e'A, with lower price /?',
increased natural fishery supply Y'y, and aquaculture fish supply
Y'A. The presence of aquaculture will lead to reduced consumer
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reduced fishing effort. If the initial equilibrium was e2 in Figure
lc, the aquaculturists would not enter.
Aquaculture supply of S"A in Figure 1 d, resulting in net demand
D'D'D in Figure lc, would lead to further fishing effort reduc-
tion. Fishermen will reduce effort, and fish stock will increase;
aquacuiturists are consequently driven down their supply curve
until they are eliminated. The existence of aquaculture h only
temporary because ofthe resulting increase in fishery efficiency.
If the aquaculturists' supply were 5:^ (Figure \d), net demand
D"'D"D (Figure lc) would result. If this occurred, equilibrium
price would be still lower (p'"), fishing effort wouid decrease
further, and suppiy from the common-property fishery (Y"F)
would deciine, since fish stock now exceeds maximum sustain-
abie yieid. The aquaculturists will produce at level Y'A.
It can be-concluded that the underlying population dynamics
ofthe biologically overexploited, open-access commercial fish-
ery acts as an additional factor to curtail the entry of commercial
aquaculturists. However, when commercial aquaculturists do
enter, the result is more efficiency in the commercial fishery.
When the fish stock is below maximum sustainable yield at the
initial equilibrium, the presence of commercial aquaculture
causes fishing effort to decrease, fish stock to increase, prices
to decline, and yield from the fishery to increase. The presence
of commercial aquaculture decreases the slope ofthe net demand '
curve for the commercial fishery. This reduces the range where
multiple equilibria can occur and decreases the risk of cata-
strophic shifts in the fishery.
Although the issues of economic efficiency and system sta-
bility under aquacultural development can be dealt with in this
analysis, questions of social welfare cannot adequately be ad-
dressed. However, in general, consumers will be better off in all
cases. Fishermen will be worse off in the short run. The long-
run impact on fishermen is indeterminate. As for aquaculturists,
there are short-run gains from aquacultural production, but it is
evident from this analysis that these gains may or may not be
retained in the long run. The intertemporal nature ofthe social
gains and losses must also be considered. The net present value
of net social benefit will depend on how social-welfare gains andAquaculture and Common-Property Commercial Fishery 9
losses are distributed over time and on the magnitude of the
discount rate.
The dynamics of the equilibria just discussed can be evaluated
by the addition ofa capital adjustment equation (using effort as
a proxy for capital) where it is assumed that effort adjustment
is a function of profit. (See Smith 1969, fora more general treat-
ment.) The effort adjustment equation is
E = a(7r) = aE(px - c) (7)
The inverse net demand derived from equations (6a and 6b) is




Substituting equations 8a and 8/? and Y = EX into equation 7
gives
E= oiE\ '-^ '-^^ - -^^ c I forp ^ - ^






























E = r-'4 (H)^^ James L. Anderson
Evaluating the derivatives around the equilibria of A" = 0 and
K = 0 results in the phase diagram in Figure la. which corre-
sponds to the initial conditions in Figure \i\ Point c'ucorresponds
to the overfishingcase and is a stable node. Point c, is an unstable
saddle point. Point e2 is a stable spiral. The entry of the aqua-
culturists reduces the first term and increases the second. This
shifts the curve for the equilibrium equations (lOa and 10/j)
downward.
The net demand relationship with the aquaculturists present
and phase diagrams are illustrated in Figures la and Ih. The
phase diagram assumes that the aquaculturists are on their sup-
ply curve at all times and fishing effort and fish stock adjust. If
the initial equilibrium is e2, the aquaculturists will not enter. The
dashed curve labeled EA' - p, -i- P271/72 in Figures la and 2b
lis defined by setting YA equal to zero and substituting into the
aquaculturist net demand equation. This gives the locus of points
to the left of which the aquaculturists are in the positive portion
of their supply relationship; all points to the right have no aqua-
culturists. To the right of the dashed line, the common-property
.supply results in a price (-71/72) which is less than the minimum
cost for aquaculture.
Figure la illustrates the phase diagram corresponding to the
case where aquaculture supply is given by S'A (Figure lc). The
approach to the equilibrium e^ previously discussed in price/
quantity space in Figure \c is reached by fishing effort and fish
stock adjusting away from e^^ along a path defined by the stable
spiral in Figure 2a with aquacultural production moving along
its supply curve. Fishing effort, fish stock, fish price, and aqua-
culture supply will all cycle toward the long-run equilibrium t-,.
In Figure 2b is a phase diagram corresponding to the situation
presented in Figure Ir where aquaculture supply is given by
S"A . In this case, the equilibrium conditions result in the eventual
elimination of the aquaculturists. The approach to this long-run
position from initial equilibrium ^n is given by a stable node.
Therefore, fishing effort and fish price will monotonically de-
crease, and fish stock and aquaculture supply will monotonically
increase until the new equilibrium is reached. It can be seen that
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hum is obtained, the common-property fishery continues to
move toward the new stable equilibrium ej.
Dominant Aquaculturist
As was noted in the introduction, several large corporations have
taken a serious interest in aquaculture production. The supply
offish could become characterized by a dominant aquacultural
firm or cartel facing a competitive open-access natural fishery.
The dominant firm is assumed to be aware of its net demand,
which takes into account the supply from the fishery. Once the
aquaculturist chooses his output level, the open-access fishery
fills in the slack demand.
The dynamic profit maximization problem for the dominant
aquaculturist is
- -iY + EX)\Y - c{r)^dt (12)
subject to X = rX (\ - -j - EX (13)
where S is the discount rate. This problem can be stated more
generally by substituting the function iri Y, E, X) for the aqua-
culturist's profit and ifiY, E, X) for the open-access fishery's
profit. Making these substitutions gives
maxf-^'Tr(r, £, X) dt (15)
r
s.t. X = fiX) - EX (16)
E = aTi{Y, E,X) (17)
The Hamiltonian is
H = e-^'MY, E, X) + KdfiX) - EX]
\E,X) (18)''' James L. Anderson
The first-order conditions are
— = e'^'lTy + XzOtTfy (19)
TT; = e-^'TXx + X,(/^ - E) + XJUTTX = -\, (20)
^^ _ -8/ _ •
BE ~ ^ '^^ ~ ^''^ '*' '^2a'n-£: = -\2 (21)





Substituting equations 22 and 23 into equation 21 yields
ince there are no endpoint restrictions on X and £, the trans-
versality condition implies that the terminal costates, X.|(oo) and
kzi^), must approach zero. This condition will result if in long-
run equilibrium X. E, and Y are constant (i.e., X = 0, E = 0).
Then, substituting equation 23 into 24 and equation 22 into 20
yields the long-run equilibrium expression
+ (fx ~ E ~ h)
X ioLTTyTTE ~ OLTTETTy + ^Tty) = 0 (25)Aquaculture and Common-Property Commercial Fishery 15
Solving for iry gives
TTy (26)
- E ~ 8)(aTT£ - 8)
+ Ux - E - ma-HE - 8)
The term TTJ' can be broken into the components of marginal
revenue of a change in aquacultural output R Y and marginal cost
cy. Substituting for TTV in equation 26 and rearranging yields
= Cy ill)
As the discount rate 8 goes to zero or as the adjustment in effort
becomes instantaneous (a approaches infinity), equation 27 sim-
plifies:
— r V—. (f Fi"\'rr 1
- (fx -
The long-run equilibrium condition of equation 28 is identical to
a profit maximization for a static case when the fishery is con-
strained to the equilibrium supply curve. Equation 28 requires
that the marginal revenue from net aquacultural demand, which
includes effort and fish stock effects, must equal the marginal
cost of aquaculture. Because ofthe backward-bending nature of
equilibrium supply EX, the profit function may be nonconvex in
the positive orthant. The second-order conditions and nonnega-
tivity constraints must be checked. There may be several local
maxima. The profits from these points must be compared to find
the global maximum.
Three possible net demands, the relevant portions of their mar-
ginal revenue curves, and price levels resulting from these curves
are shown in Figures 3«. 3>b, and 3c for the case where Cy is
increasing. Figure 3« illustrates a simple comparison of long-run
equilibrium resulting from a dominant firm and from competitive
aquaculturists, both with high marginal costs. Assume an initialMC
Y Y" Y'
AO AM A
FIGURE 3a. Dominant firm aquaculturist, a.
16FIGURE 3b. Dominant firm aquacullurist, h.
17Y =¥• Y'
0 A AM
FIGCRE 3c. Dominant firm aquaculturist, c.
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common-property equilibrium of Co. The dominant aquaculturist
will shift the equilibrium to C'AM while a competitive aquaculturist
will shift the equilibrium to e'^. The presence of the competitive
aquaculturist results in lower prices, higher output, and greater
natural fish stocks relative to the dominant firm case.
Figure 3/7 illustrates a case where there are two local profit
maxima. In this case, the aquaculturist must compare the two
discounted profits from attaining the local maxima to determine
the global maximum. Assuming that initially the common-prop-
erty fishery is at stable equilibrium co. the dominant aquacul-
turist has a local profit maximum at equilibrium e'A^f^ with price
P'AMI and output YAMI and another at e'AMi with price P'A\42 and
output Y'AM2. The first equilibrium ^AM] results in little change
in fishing effort and natural fish stock from the initial equilibrium
£•(). If the aquaculturist decides that discounted profits are greater
from moving the system to the equilibrium CAMI, there will be
significant reductions in fishing effort, increased natural fish
stock, and lower consumer prices. The competitive aquaculturist
equilibrium e'A would, however, result in even greater aquacul-
tural production, lower fishing effort, higher natural fish stock,
and lower consumer prices, assuming identical marginal cost
curves.
It was shown that if a competitive aquacultural supply were
S'A shown in Figure ]d and in the phase diagram of Figure 2b,
and if the fishery were initially overfished (point ('<,), entry of a
competitive aquaculturist would result in a new equilibrium
e'A, at which the aquaculturist is eliminated. However, the dom-
inant aquaculturist could prevent this result by controlling the
price through his output decisions. If the initial equilibrium is eo
in Figure 3c, the entry of the price leader aquaculturist will cause
a shift to C'AM. When the initial equilibrium is e2, the dominant
aquaculturist would still want the system to move to C'AM- How-
ever, the competitive aquaculturist would not enter. Whether or
not the aquaculturist could move to CAM depends on the dynam-
ics of fishing effort and fish population. This will be discussed
later. The important point is that the aquaculturist may desire
to drive the system from a point below maximum sustainable
yield to one characterized by overfishing, higher price, and re-^^ James L. Anderson
duction of both fishery and total fish supply. This contrasts with
the competitive aquaculturist case where all stable equilibria
result in reduced fishing effort, lower prices, and greater total
supply.
It should be reemphasized that it is always assumed when
comparing dominant and competitive aquaculturists that they
have identical marginal cost curves. In general, one would expect
the competitive aquaculturist to have higher marginal cost be-
cause the dominant aquaculturist can benefit from economies of
scale. If the marginal cost curves are not identical, the compar-
isons do not apply.
The impact of a positive discount rate 6 and an effort adjust-
ment coefficient (a less than infinity) on the long-run equilibrium
can be evaluated from equation 28. An increase in the discount
rate 8 decreases the denominator relative to the numerator, re-
sulting in an increase in the second term. When the coefficient
of effort adjustment a is less than infinity, the second term de-
creases; the net effect is indeterminate. From the aquaculturist's
point of view, a positive discount rate requires an increase in
the growth rate of profit. This is achieved by reducing equilib-
rium aquacultura! output, which raises price, increases fishing
effort, and reduces fish stock relative to the zero-discount-rate
case. The adjustment of fishing effort has an opposite effect on
equation 28 compared to the discount rate.
Dynamic analysis has the additional complication of control-
lability. It was previously observed that the dominant firm may
desire to move the open-access fishery from a fish stock less
than maximum sustainable yield to an overfishing equilibrium.
When the dynamics of fishing effort and fish population are con-
sidered, this may not be possible to do using the control Y^.
Consider the equilibrium e2 in Figure 3r. If the aquaculturist's
desired optimal long-run equilibrium was e'^, the aquaculturist
could only get there if he could force the fishery to drive fish
stock down. In the phase diagram, this occurs when E and X
are attracted to the equilibria at which overfishing occurs. The
aquaculturist would have to incur a negative output to raise price
to a level which shifts the £" = 0 condition to result in increasing
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nonnegativity constraint. Therefore, the desired optimal equi-
librium solution is not possible with the control YA.
Conclusion
In the first part of this paper, several conclusions were reached.
The stable equilibrium resulting from the entry of aquaculture
will increase efficiency in the natural commercial fishery, in-
prease natural fish stock levels, and lower consumer prices. In-
creased fishery efficiency results when fishermen are forced to
reduce effort. The common-property nature of the fishery in-
hibits entry by the aquaculturist when the initial natural fish
stock is less than maximum sustainable yield. It was also shown
that cases exist where the presence of the aquaculturist will only
be temporary. This can result when fish stock is initially less
than maximum sustainable yield. When price is lowered by the
aquaculturist's presence, thereby reducing fishing effort, the fish
stock may recover to a sufficiently high level such that at the
new equilibrium, common-property fishery production costs are
less than those of the aquaculturist.
The second section presented an analysis of a dominant aqua-
culturist. It was found that, if marginal costs are the same as for
a competitive aquaculturist, entry by a dominant aquaculturist
will reduce consumer prices, reduce commercial fishing effort,
or increase fish stock but not as much as in the case of the
competitive aquaculturist. The competitive aquaculturist may
cause a biologically overexploited fishery to move to an equi-
librium where fish stocks are greater than maximum sustainable
yield levels while the aquaculturist may be content with an ex-
ploitation rate where fish stock is lower than maximum sustain-
able yield. It was also shown that the dominant aquaculturist
would never be driven out of business by the recovery of the
fish stock. This is because the aquaculturist is aware of the net
demand facing the firm and controls price through output de-
cisions.
One of the common public poiicy goals of fishery management
is to increase the stock of fisheries which public institutions con-
sider to be overexploited. The introduction of competitive aqua-Aquaculture and Common-Property Commercial Fishery 23
culture facilitates this goal at the expense of those forced to
reduce fishing effort. In cases where aquaculture is not present,
public policies aimed at reducing exploitation of the stock typ-
ically force the fishery to become less efficient. The resultant
inefficiency leads to an increase in consumer prices. When com-
petitive aquacuiture is present, however, overexploitation ofthe
natural stock is reduced, total supply is increased, efficiency
increases, and prices may fall. If the aquaculturist acts as a dom-
inant firm, the promotion of aquaculture will not necessarily aug-
ment fish management objectives.
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